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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MARYLAND CIRCUIT COURTS
HAVE PARENS PATRIAE JURISDICTION TO AUTHORIZE
GUARDIANS TO CONSENT TO STERILIZATION OF INCOMPETENT MINORS WHEN THE PROCEDURE IS MEDICALLY
NECESSARY. Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hospital, Inc., 293
Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982).

Wentzel v. Montgomery General Hospital, Inc. I involved the petition for a court order authorizing the sterilization of Sonya Star Flanary, a blind and severely mentally retarded thirteen year 01d. 2 Mrs.
Nancy Wentzel and Ms. Gail Sheppard, the child's grandmother and
aunt respectively, filed the petition in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County after the hospital refused to perform a hysterectomy without judicial authorization. 3 The circuit court concluded that Sonya was
incapable of consenting to the procedure herself and, appointing Mrs.
Wentzel and Ms. Sheppard as co-guardians of the child and her property, denied them permission to consent to the operation. 4 The trial
court held that it was powerless to grant the requested relief absent
specific statutory authorization or a life threatening situation. 5 The
guardians appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, but
certiorari was granted by the court of appeals prior to the intermediate
appellate court's consideration. 6
The sole issue, as framed by the court of appeals, was whether a
court of general jurisdiction is empowered to grant a guardian'S petition to sterilize an incompetent minor.7 After concluding that circuit
courts have subject matter jurisdiction to consider such a petition,S the
court enumerated and discussed procedural requirements which a court
I. 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982).
2. Id at 687-88, 447 A.2d at 1245-46. Sonya reportedly has an I.Q. of 25 to 30, the
equivalent of a mental age of one to two years. Although she was a normal child
at birth, Sonya suffered severe brain damage and other physical injuries in an
automobile accident when she was five months old. fd at 687, 447 A.2d at 1246.
3. fd at 687-88, 447 A.2d at 1246. Although it was argued that Sonya is an easy
target for rape and possible resulting pregnancy, the principal motivation for the
guardians' request for sterilization was to terminate Sonya's menstruation and resulting pain and disorientation. fd Judge Smith, in his part concurring and part
dissenting opinion, reviewed the testimony at length and stressed this point. See
id. at 706-12, 447 A.2d at 1255-58 (Smith, J., concurring and dissenting).
4. Id at 689-90, 447 A.2d at 1247.
5. fd. at 690, 447 A.2d at 1247.
6. fd.

7. Id at 687, 447 A.2d at 1245.
8. fd at 702, 447 A.2d at 1253. Under a parens patriae theory, meaning "father of
the country," the state assumes the common law equity jurisdiction of guardianship over minors and other persons under disability. See also Taylor v. Taylor,
246 Md. 616, 229 A.2d 131 (1967); Thistlewood v. Ocean City, 236 Md. 548, 204
A.2d 688 (1964); Stirn v. Stirn, 183 Md. 59, 36 A.2d 695 (1944); Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 614 (1929); Jenkins v. Whyte, 62 Md. 427 (1884); Ellis v.
Ellis, 19 Md. App. 361, 311 A.2d 428 (1973).
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must observe to protect the ward's interests,9 coupled with factors to be
considered in determining whether sterilization is in the incompetent's
best interests. 1O The court held that in addition to these factors, consent
to sterilization could be judicially authorized only when it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the procedure is "medically necessary to preserve the life or physical or mental health of the
incompetent minor."ll Emphasizing that society's welfare and a
guardian's convenience should play no part in a court's consideration,
the majority upheld the trial court's decision that Sonya's pain, irritability, disorientation, and general inability to cope with her menstrual
cycle were of insufficient danger to her health to justify sterilization. 12
Additionally, the court of appeals called upon the legislature to declare
the state's public policy with regard to the sterilization issue. 13
Sterilization of the mentally retarded has been at issue in the
United States for nearly a century. What began as the legally unauthorized experimentation with institutionalized incompetents soon
gained widespread support as the eugenics movement flourished at the
beginning of the twentieth century. 14 Eugenicists sought elimination of
9. 293 Md. 685, 703, 447 A.2d 1244, 1253-54 (1982). The court must: (I) appoint an
independent guardian ad litem to act on behalf of the ward at a full jUdicial hearing; (2) receive independent medical, psychological and social evaluations from
court-appointed experts if necessary; (3) personally meet with the ward to make its
own determination regarding competency and the ward's desires; and (4) find by
clear and convincing evidence that the ward lacks competency to make the sterilization decision and that the incapacity is not likely to change. Id.
10. Id. at 703, 447 A.2d at 1254. The factors are: (I) whether the incompetent minor
is capable of reproduction; (2) the child's age and circumstances; (3) the extent of
the child's exposure to sexual contact; (4) the feasibility of utilizing effective contraception in lieu of sterilizaton; (5) the availability of less intrusive sterilization
procedures; and (6) the possibility that future scientific advances will result in
improvement of the ward's mental condition. Id.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 704-05, 447 A.2d at 1254.
13. Id. at 705,447 A.2d at 1255 ("In view of the profound and recurring nature of the
issue here involved, and its obvious importance to the public, the legislature may
deem it appropriate" to enact statutory guidahce.).
14. Eugenics, a term coined by Sir Francis Galton in 1883, was the study of genetically transmitted characteristics for the purpose of improving future generations
of the human race. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27
OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 591 (1966). Sterilization o(those thought to carry undesirable
genes was a necessary outgrowth of the eugenics theory.
The philosophical forerunners of eugenics, Mendelism and Social Darwinism, were practiced throughout Europe in the mid-1800's. The social and political
attitude in the United States in the late 19th century contributed to guarded acceptance of the hereditarian philosophies because emphasis was on the welfare of
society as a whole rather than individual rights. See Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1423-24, 1426-27
(1981). Eugenics advocates began private campaigns by systematically sterilizing
youngsters at institutions. Although public disapproval led to an abrupt halt to
this experimentation, successful lobbying efforts for legal endorsement of these
programs soon ensued. Id. at 1431-33. See text accompanying notes 17-23 infra.
For an excellent synopsis of the history and theory of eugenics, see Cynkar,
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defective genes from the human race. 15 Their theory affected the retarded, the insane, the criminal and those with stigmatizing diseases
such as epilepsy.16 Statutes providing for the compulsory sterilization
of these designated groups were soon introduced in state legislatures; 17
the first to be enacted was Indiana's in 1907. 18 Although many of the
first statutes were found constitutionally deficient,19 the Virginia statute
of 1924 was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Buck Y.
Bell, 20 a 1927 decision. Amidst a barrage of constitutional arguments,21 the Court held that, considering the public welfare, it was
within the state's police power to prevent the "manifestly unfit" from
procreating. 22 With this Supreme Court sanction, thirty states eventually enacted compulsory eugenic sterilization laws. 23
Years later, however, scientific discoveries and changing social and
1982]
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Buck v. Bell: "Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1418
(1981). For thorough treatment of the subject, including its theory, history, sociological implications, legal principles, and statutory development, see M. HALLER,
EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN AlTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1963); J.
LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION (1932); H. LAUGHLIN, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1922).
15. See note 14 supra. Preventing the transmittal of undesirable genes was known as
"negative" eugenics. "Positive" eu~enics consisted of the identification of preferred traits or cultural characteristics to encourage further breeding of indiViduals thought to possess those traits. See M. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN
AlTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 77-82 (1963); Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: "Felt
Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1427-30 (1981).
16. See H. LAUGHLIN, THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION 65 (1929).
17. See Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
591,592-93 (1966). Michigan and Pennsylvania were the first states to introduce
eugenic sterilization statutes. Although the Pennsylvania bill was passed by its
legislature, the governor vehemently vetoed it. See id
18. Id at 592. Fourteen years later, the Act was declared unconstitutional as violative
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind.
526, 527-28, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (1921).
19. See, e.g., Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (sterilization of criminals
is cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914)
(violating procedural due process), rev'd on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917)
(moot as a result of intervening state legislation); Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526,
131 N.E. 2 (1921) (violating procedural due process); Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit
Judge, 201 Mich. 138, 166 N.W. 938 (1918) (violating equal protection clause);
Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feeble-Minded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (1913)
(violating equal protection clause).
20. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had previously
upheld the statute under both the state and federal constitutions. Buck v. Bell,
143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925), ajf'd, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Prior to the Bell
decision, appellate courts in at least two states had upheld their sterilization laws.
See Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925); Washington v.
Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75 (1912).
21. It was argued that the Virginia statute violated procedural and substantive due
process as well as the equal protection guarantee. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 20102 (1927).
22. Id at 207. Justice Holmes, in his brief opinion, likened the compulsory sterilization statute to laws requiring vaccination of school children. Id
23. See J. LANDMAN, HUMAN STERILIZATION 54-93 (1932). Maryland was not
among those thirty states.
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political policies contributed to the repeal or constitutional invalidation
of many of these statutes. First, the eugenics theory fell into disrepute
among scientists. 24 Few of the causes of mental retardation were found
to be genetically transmitted,25 and of those, some are passed on by
intellectually normal individuals, thereby causing great difficulty in
identifying a carrier prior to the birth of his or her child. 26 The social
aspects of eugenics also came into question. One commentator described eugenics as an exercise in "rampant racism";27 others criticized
the movement as reminiscent of the Hitlerian philosophies practiced in
Nazi Germany.28 One court stated, "We cannot adequately express
our abhorrence for the kind of ideology that assigns vastly differing
value to the lives of human beings because of their innate group characteristics or personal handicaps."29 These attitudes were reflected in
changing legal standards and the recognition of fundamental rights,
specifically including the right to procreate. 30 This increased awareness
of individual rights, accompanied by the higher standard applied when
fundamental rights are implicated,31 left few remaining statutory
guidelines for courts approached by parents or guardians requesting
judicial authorization for sterilization of their children or wards. 32
24. See Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded' Constitutional. Statutory and
Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REv. 943, 949-50 (1982). See generally Note, Eugenic Sterilization-A Scient!ftc Analysis, 46 DEN. L.J. 631 (1969).
25. See Ross, Sterilization ofthe Developmentally Disabled' Shedding Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 599, 614-15 (1981); Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing
the Retarded' Constitutional. Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REv. 943,
949-50 (1982).
26. See Ross, Sterilization ofthe Developmentally Disabled' Shedding Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 599, 615 (1981). Furthermore, it has been asserted
that even if all defectives could be sterilized, only an eleven percent reduction of
retardation would result. Id at 614 n.60.
27. S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 22 (1981).
28. Comment, A Conflict of Choice: California Considers Statutory Authorityfor Involuntary Sterilization of the Severely Mentally Retarded, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 495,
495 (1982). See generally S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 22. (1981).
29. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 245, 426 A.2d 467, 472 (1981).
30. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942) (statute authorizing the sterilization of criminals violated the equal protection clause, and the right to procreate
was designated "one of the basic civil rights of man"). Following Skinner, several
privacy rights evolving from the right to procreate were recognized by the
Supreme Court. E.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(right to use contraceptives extended to minors); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976) (minor has right to obtain an abortion without parental consent); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state cannot interfere with woman's right
to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (unmarried persons have right to acquire and use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (state could not interfere with
married person's right to use contraceptives).
31. When fundamental rights are implicated, courts apply a strict scrutiny analysis
whereby states have the burden of proving that the challenged law serves a compelling and overriding state interest. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 382-83 (1978).
32. For an analysis and classification of the remaining statutes, see Ross, Sterilization
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Courts have responded to this challenge of balancing the often divergent needs of society, guardians, arid incompetents in a variety of
ways.33 Emphasizing that sterilization is an extreme remedy irreversibly denying the fundamental right to beget children, the majority of
courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction absent specific statutory
authority satisfying constitutional requirements, providing adequate
safeguards, and reflecting current social policy.34 More recently, however, some courts are taking the opposite approach, asserting that absent legislative or constitutional prohibition, courts of general
jurisdiction are empowered to decide such controversies. 35 These
courts stress their inherent equity powers and often apply the parens
patriae doctrine, under which state courts have plenary power to provide for the general well-being of disabled persons. In some cases, this
result is reached by a broad interpretation of guardianship statutes and

of the Developmentally Disabled: Shedding Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 599,606-11 (1981).
33. For a discussion of these confiicting needs in conjunction with new justifications
for sterilization statutes, see Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded: Constitutional, Statutory and Policy Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REV. 943, 951-53 (1982).
34. E.g., Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979) ("the profound nature of
the constitutional and social issues . . . preclude judicial resolution"); In re Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1978) (power to authorize sterilization can derive only from explicit legislation and cannot be inferred from general
principles of common law), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); In re S.C.E., 378
A.2d 144 (Del. Ch. 1977) (denying jurisdiction based on a subsequently reversed
case); A.L. v. G.R.H., 163 Ind. App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501 (1975) (common law
does not confer upon parents the power to consent to sterilization of their children), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Holmes v. Powers, 439 S.W.2d 579, 580
(Ky. 1969) (when there is no statutory or common law authority permitting sterilization of an incompetent adult, the court may not "fill the void"); In re M.K.R.,
515 S.W.2d 467, 471 (Mo. 1974) (resolution of the issue rests with "the people's
elected representatives . . . after full consideration of the constitutional rights of
the individual and the general welfare of the people"); Frazier v. Levi, 440 S.W.2d
393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (noting that sterilization statutes have been held valid,
the court concluded that acting in absence of statutory authority would be in excess of judicial authority).
35. E.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1981) (broadly construing guardianship
statute); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 374 (Colo. 1981) (illustrating other difficult
cases in which courts have asserted parens patriae jurisdiction to authorize consent
to surgery upon incompetents); In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982)
(authorizing sterilization by finding that the incompetent would so choose if competent); In re Penny N., 120 N.H. 269, 414 A.2d 541 (1980) (enumerating procedural requirements and utilizing "clear and convincing evidence" standard of
proof); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (enunciating a constitutional
right to sterilization and exercising substituted judgment to authorize sterilization); In re Hayes, 93 Wash. 228, 230, 608 P.2d 635, 637 (1980) (referring to other
courts' denial of jurisdiction as "an abdication of the judicial function," the court
held that sterilization could be authorized if same is in the best interests of the
retarded person). But see In re Eberhardy, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881
(1981) (assertin~jurisdiction but refusing to make a determination because of the
delicate policy lssues involved). For a discussion and comparison of several of
these cases, see Comment, A Conflict of Choice: California Considers Statutory A uthority for Involuntary Sterilization of the Severely Mentally Retarded, 4 WHITTIER L. REV. 495, 502-10 (1982).
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substitution of the court as legal guardian. 36 Reflecting a consciousness
of the prior abuses, each court has enumerated a myriad of requirements to be complied with and factors to be considered before authorization of sterilization may issue. Adding to the confusion, even these
responses have differed widely - some courts confine themselves to a
medical necessity standard,37 while others expand upon their parens patriae role by using the doctrine of substituted consent whereby the
court seeks to determine what decision would be made by the incompetent if he or she could so choose. 38
Having thoroughly reviewed judicial responses of other jurisdictions,39 the court of appeals in Wentzel examined Maryland's guardianship statute40 to determine whether its provisions could be interpreted
to sanction guardian consent to sterilization.41 The guardians argued
that section 13-708 of the Estates and Trusts Article,42 empowering a
court to invest a guardian with powers necessary to provide for the
"demonstrated need"43 of the ward and to give consent for medical
care,44 encompassed their right to consent to Sonya's sterilization. The
court explored the legislative history of the provision and concluded
that the section was inapplicable to the present case as it does not pertain to the guardianship of minors.45 The court noted, however, that
the statute parallels the common law parens patriae power which is
well-established in Maryland and held that the doctrine was sufficiently
pervasive to afford jurisdiction in this case. 46 After specifying the standards and factors to apply,47 the court upheld the trial court's denial of
permission for the operation. 48
Despite the sparsity of legal precedent in Maryland yielding litigants little guidance for the presentation of their evidence, the court
refused to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration in light
of the new standards.49 By summarily concluding that the guardians
could not produce evidence sufficient to meet the standards, the majority took a narrow view of medical necessity, a stance which, according
36. E.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607,612 (Alaska 1981) (the statute empowers guardians to "give any consents or approvals that may be necessary to enable the ward
to receive medical or other professional care").
37. E.g., In re AW., 637 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1981).
38. E.g., In re Moe, 385 Mass. 555,432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235,
426 A2d 467 (1981).
39. Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 691-99, 447 A.2d 1244,
1248-51 (1982).
40. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 13-101 to -806 (Supp. 1981).
41. 293 Md. 685, 699-701, 447 A.2d 1244, 1252 (1982).
42. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-708 (Supp. 1981).
43. Id § 13-708(a).
44. Id § 13-708(b)(8).
45. 293 Md. 685, 701,447 A.2d 1244, 1252 (1982).
46. Id at 701-02, 447 A2d at 1252-53.
47. See notes 9 & 10 supra.
48. 293 Md. 685, 704-05, 447 A2d 1244, 1254 (1982).
49. See id at 718, 447 A.2d at 1261 (Digges, J., concurring and dissenting).
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to dissentin§ Judges Smith and Davidson, unduly restricts the power of
the courts. 5
Implicit in the court's decision is the fear of repetition of the past
reprehensible conduct, the prior abuse which saw the across-the-board
sterilization of thousands of individuals. However, this trepidation has
resulted in an overcompensation and, unfortunately, a judicial paralysis which leaves many remediless. The court failed to consider the
source of the prior abuse - a society in which the protection and improvement of society itself were the ultimate considerations and in
which sterilization was compulsory and routinely performed without
the benefit of procedural safeguards, now present, affording the incompetent a forum in which his or her constitutional rights amId be fully
adjudicated. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the present
request for sterilization emanated from the child's legal guardians who
are charged with the responsibility of fulfilling her every need and who,
in fact, are in the best position to ascertain what is in her best interests.
There is always a danger that the guardian'S personal convenience
would actuate his or her request for the ward's sterilization; sterilization performed at the mere whim of a guardian would be intolerable
and would obliterate the strides made in the recognition and protection
of fundamental rights. However, courts, which daily make determinations regarding credibility, are certainly capable of ascertaining
whether the principle motivation for the request for sterilization comes
from a sincere concern for and a desire to comfort the incompetent. 5 1
As one commentator noted, "any policy that does not allow parental or
guardian consent for sterilization in the most compelling cases is inhumane and ultimately shortsighted. "52
In its effort to protect the right to procreation, a right which is
surely meaningless to a child like Sonya, the court of appeals sacrificed
another right, the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily. 53 This
presents what one court expressed as a "disturbing paradox" - how to
exercise a profoundly personal right for one incapable of making such
50. Both Judges Smith and Davidson concurred in the majority's holding that circuit
courts have jurisdiction to consider petitions for sterilization. However, both
judges disagreed with the majority's standards and ultimate resolution of the case.
See id. at 705-18, 447 A.2d at 1255-61 (Smith, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at
718-25,447 A.2d at 1261-64 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
51. The trial judge in Wentzel noted that the guardians sincerely believed that sterilizaton was in Sonya's best interests. Id. at 689, 447 A.2d at 1247.
52. Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded.' Constitutional, Statutory and Policy
Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REv. 943, 945 (1982).
53. Although the United States Supreme Court has not expressly recognized the right
to sterilization, several courts have concluded that such a right exists as a necessary extension of other privacy rights. E.g., Hathaway v. Worcester, 475 F.2d 701,
705 (1st Cir. 1973); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 366-68 (D. Conn. 1978);
Peck v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 484, 486-87 (C.D. Utah 1977); In re Grady, 85 N.J.
235, 247, 426 A.2d 467, 473 (1981). See note 30 supra.
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a choice herself. 54 Judges Smith and Davidson advocated using a substituted judgment standard to answer this difficult question. 55 This
standard, which has been used in the past to authorize other serious
surgical procedures upon incompetents and to withdraw life support
systems,56 has been criticized as unrealistic since it is difficult, if not
impossible, to know what one who has been incompetent and unable to
voice his or her opinions and desires would choose. 57 However, substituted judgment is still the best vehicle for focusing upon the incompetent's needs and presumed desires and allowing some judicial
discretion without sacrificing fundamental rights. Conversely, the current medical necessity standard, strictly construed, causes undue hesitancy and can only serve to promote further suffering58 for people like
Sonya for whom no alternatives are available. 59
It is now up to the legislature to provide relief. Prior to the Wentzel decision, a bill providing for the voluntary sterilization of incompe54. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 235, 426 A.2d 467, 469 (1981).
55. Judge Smith questioned, "Do my colleagues doubt for one instant what Sonya's
choice would be under the circumstances here if she 'were in a position to make a
soundjudgment'?" 293 Md. 685, 717, 447 A.2d 1244, 1260 (1982) (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 758, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783, 787
(1974». See id at 723-24, 447 A.2d at 1263 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
56. E.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (authorization for
kidney transplant from incompetent to his brother); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School ,v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 740, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)
(chemotherapy treatment); 'Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905
(1976) (shock treatment); In r,e Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (withdrawal of
artificial life support mechanisms), cert denied sub nom Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976); New Jersey v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,181 A.2d 751 (blood transfusion), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372
A.2d 360 (1977) (amputation of leg). See generally Robertson, Organ Donations
by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48
(1976).
57. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64,438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
58. The following case is illustrative of the suffering caused by a strict interpretation
of "medical necessity." A New York trial court denied the State's request for an
abortion for a 25-year-old institutionalized incompetent woman whose I.Q. was
12. The request was denied because the state had failed to prove that the abortion
was medically necessary, despite medical testimony that the woman was frightened and that proceeding with the pregnancy would be "emotionally traumatic"
for her. Weeks later, however, using a different standard, the court allowed the
abortion on the consent of the parents. N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1982, at AI, col. 5.
The court's hesitancy caused the incompetent woman to suffer five additional
weeks of a pregnancy that she did not understand and to incur a greater risk
during and after performance of the abortion.
59. Although there are several available methods of contraception which are less
drastic means than sterilization for preventing pregnancy, there is only one known
method, injectable Depo Provera, that produces both contraception and an absence of menstruation. The Food and Drug Administration has forbidden its use,
leaving sterilization as the only alternative for eliminating menstruation. See
Sherlock & Sherlock, Sterilizing the Retarded· Constitutional, Statutory and Policy
Alternatives, 60 N.C.L. REv. 943, 971-72 (1982).
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tents was introduced in the Maryland House of Delegates. 6o As
currently drafted, in addition to providing procedures which must be
followed,61 the bill allows circuit courts to authorize sterilization upon
a finding that it would be in the "best interest" of the incompetent. 62
To make this determination, the court must consider several factors,
including the availability of less drastic means of contraception and the
petitioner's motivation for seeking the sterilization. 63 Although the bill
never reached the house floor for full debate and a vote,64 it is to be
revised and reintroduced for further consideration. 65 In light of the
Wentzel decision, hopefully the legislators will take a more serious look
and enact this remedial legislation.

Lori Joy Eisner

60. H.D. 1850, Md. Gen. Assembly, 1982 Sess. The bill, sponsored by Delegate
Judith Toth of Montgomery County, was introduced on February 24, 1982.
61. Id. lines 147-71.
62. Id. lines 178-86.
63. Id. lines 188-214.
64. The bill was sent to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Delegates for preliminary consideration. It received an unfavorable vote on March 29, 1982, and
was returned to Delegate Toth for revisions. See Vote tally sheet in the House of
Delegates Judiciary Committee file on H.D. 1850.
65. Telephone interview with Delegate Judith Toth, House of Delegates, Maryland
General Assembly (Nov. 4, 1982).

